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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO	
09/781,486	02/12/2001	Monisha Ghosh	US 010027	US 010027 9502	
24737 7:	590 11/23/2005		EXAM	EXAMINER	
PHILIPS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & STANDARDS			WONG, ALLEN C		
P.O. BOX 3001 BRIARCLIFF	I MANOR, NY 10510		ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER	
	,		2613	_	
			DATE MAILED: 11/23/2005		

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

## Advisory Action Before the Filing of an Appeal Brief

Application No.	Applicant(s)		
09/781,486	GHOSH, MONISHA	GHOSH, MONISHA	
Examiner	Art Unit		
Allen Wong	2613		

before the Filling of all Appeal Brief	Examiner	Art Unit					
	Allen Wong	2613					
The MAILING DATE of this communication appe	ars on the cover sheet with the c	orrespondence add	ress				
THE REPLY FILED <u>12 October 2005</u> FAILS TO PLACE THIS A	APPLICATION IN CONDITION FO	R ALLOWANCE.					
<ol> <li>The reply was filed after a final rejection, but prior to or of this application, applicant must timely file one of the folloplaces the application in condition for allowance; (2) a No. (3) a Request for Continued Examination (RCE) in completion of the following time periods:</li> </ol>	wing replies: (1) an amendment, a otice of Appeal (with appeal fee) in	ffidavit, or other evide compliance with 37 (	ence, which CFR 41.31; or				
a) The period for reply expires <u>3</u> months from the mailing date of	the final rejection.						
b) The period for reply expires on: (1) the mailing date of this Advievent, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later that	isory Action, or (2) the date set forth in the an SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of	f the final rejection.					
	Examiner Note: If box 1 is checked, check either box (a) or (b). ONLY CHECK BOX (b) WHEN THE FIRST REPLY WAS FILED WITHIN TWO MONTHS OF THE FINAL REJECTION. See MPEP 706.07(f).						
Extensions of time may be obtained under 37 CFR 1.136(a). The date on been filed is the date for purposes of determining the period of extension a CFR 1.17(a) is calculated from: (1) the expiration date of the shortened stabove, if checked. Any reply received by the Office later than three months earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).  NOTICE OF APPEAL	nd the corresponding amount of the fee. atutory period for reply originally set in the	The appropriate extension final Office action; or (2)	n fee under 37 as set forth in (b)				
2. The Notice of Appeal was filed on A brief in composition of filing the Notice of Appeal (37 CFR 41.37(a)), or any explore a Notice of Appeal has been filed, any reply must be a since a Notice of Appeal has been filed.	xtension thereof (37 CFR 41.37(e))	, to avoid dismissal d	of the appeal.				
AMENDMENTS							
3.  The proposed amendment(s) filed after a final rejection, (a) They raise new issues that would require further co (b) They raise the issue of new matter (see NOTE belo	nsideration and/or search (see NO		pecause				
(c) They are not deemed to place the application in bet appeal; and/or	ter form for appeal by materially re		the issues for				
(d) They present additional claims without canceling a NOTE: (See 37 CFR 1.116 and 41.33(a)).		ected claims.	·				
1. The amendments are not in compliance with 37 CFR 1.1	21. See attached Notice of Non-Co	empliant Amendment	(PTOL-324).				
5. Applicant's reply has overcome the following rejection(s)			•				
<ol> <li>Newly proposed or amended claim(s) would be a the non-allowable claim(s).</li> </ol>			_				
7. For purposes of appeal, the proposed amendment(s): a) how the new or amended claims would be rejected is protein the status of the claim(s) is (or will be) as follows:	☐ will not be entered, or b) ☒ wivided below or appended.	ill be entered and an	explanation of				
Claim(s) allowed:							
Claim(s) objected to: <u>5-8,11-16,19-22 and 25-29</u> . Claim(s) rejected: <u>1-4,9,10,17,18,23 and 24</u> . Claim(s) withdrawn from consideration:							
Claim(s) withdrawn from consideration:  AFFIDAVIT OR OTHER EVIDENCE							
3.  The affidavit or other evidence filed after a final action, but because applicant failed to provide a showing of good and and was not earlier presented. See 37 CFR 1.116(e).	ut before or on the date of filing a N d sufficient reasons why the affidav	lotice of Appeal will <u>n</u> /it or other evidence i	ot be entered s necessary				
The affidavit or other evidence filed after the date of filing entered because the affidavit or other evidence failed to o showing a good and sufficient reasons why it is necessary	vercome <u>all</u> rejections under appea y and was not earlier presented.  S	al and/or appellant fai ee 37 CFR 41.33(d)(	Is to provide a 1).				
0. ☐ The affidavit or other evidence is entered. An explanation REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION/OTHER	n of the status of the claims after e	ntry is below or attac	hed.				
1. The request for reconsideration has been considered bu See Continuation Sheet.	t does NOT place the application in	n condition for allowa	nce because:				
<ul><li>2.  Note the attached Information Disclosure Statement(s).</li><li>3.  Other:</li></ul>	(PTO/SB/08 or PTO-1449) Paper i	No(s)					
<del></del>		MM	4				
		Allen Wong Primary Examiner					
		Art Unit: 2613					

Continuation of 11, does NOT place the application in condition for allowance because: Continuation of 11, does NOT place the application in condition for allowance because: All of the limitations of the claims have been addressed in the previous Office Action sent on 8/31/05. Regarding page 14 of applicant's remarks, applicant states that rejection based on Jun is improper. The examiner respectfully disagrees. There is nothing improper about using Jun since the applicant's application filing date 2/12/01, and Jun's application filing date is 11/28/00 and foreign priority date is 6/12/00, both of Jun's dates are definitely prior to the present application's filing date. Thus, Jun is a valid reference with a valid effective date prior to the applicant's US filing date. Appicant argues hindsight reasoning was used. The examiner respectfully disagrees. It must be recognized that any judgment on obviousness is in a sense necessarily a reconstruction based upon hindsight reasoning. But so long as it takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made, and does not include knowledge gleaned only from the applicant's disclosure, such a reconstruction is proper. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 170 USPQ 209 (CCPA 1971). The examiner recognizes that obviousness can only be established by combining or modifying the teachings of the prior art to produce the claimed invention where there is some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to do so found either in the references themselves or in the knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art. See In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 5 USPQ2d 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1988)and In re Jones, 958 F.2d 347, 21 USPQ2d 1941 (Fed. Cir. 1992). In this case, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to combine the teachings of Jun and Betts, as a whole, for implementing the data switches so as to guide the full rate or low rate data packets to their proper destination for receiving and viewing television programs and other programming in an efficient, precise manner. Regarding page 15-16 of applicant's arguments, applicant attempts to argue that Lyons does not disclose each of one or more of the data bytes containing both bearing bits and non-information bearing bits. The examiner respectfully disagrees. Lyons teaches that each of one or more of the data bytes containing both bearing bits and non-information bearing bits, as suggested in col.3, In.1-11 and col.6, In.5-11, where Lyons asserts that each one or more of the data byte contain important data and non-important data, ie. bearing bits noninformation bearing bits. Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to combine the teachings of Jun and Lyons, as a whole, for receiving and viewing HDTV television programs and other programming in an efficient, precise manner, as disclosed in Lyons' col.2, lines 44-49. Thus, claim 1 is met. Claims 2-4 are rejected for at least similar reasons as claim 1. Regarding pages 17-22 of applicant's arguments about claims 17 and 23, applicant states that Lyons does not disclose each of one or more of the data bytes containing both bearing bits and non-information bearing bits. The examiner respectfully disagrees. See above analysis for claim 1. The corresponding dependent claims 18 and 24 are rejected for at least similar reasons as claims 17 and 23. Again, on page 22 of applicant's remarks, applicant states that rejection based on Jun is improper. The examiner respectfully disagrees. There is nothing improper about using Jun since the applicant's application filing date 2/12/01, and Jun's application filing date is 11/28/00 and foreign priority date is 6/12/00, both of Jun's dates are definitely prior to the present application's filing date. Thus, Jun is a valid reference with a valid effective date prior to the applicant's US filing date. Applicant argues hindsight reasoning was used. The examiner respectfully disagrees. It must be recognized that any judgment on obviousness is in a sense necessarily a reconstruction based upon hindsight reasoning. But so long as it takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made, and does not include knowledge gleaned only from the applicant's disclosure, such a reconstruction is proper. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 170 USPQ 209 (CCPA 1971). The examiner recognizes that obviousness can only be established by combining or modifying the teachings of the prior art to produce the claimed invention where there is some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to do so found either in the references themselves or in the knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art. See In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 5 USPQ2d 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1988)and In re Jones, 958 F.2d 347, 21 USPQ2d 1941 (Fed. Cir. 1992). In this case, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to combine the teachings of Jun and Betts, as a whole, for implementing the data switches so as to guide the full rate or low rate data packets to their proper destination for receiving and viewing television programs and other programming in an efficient, precise manner. Regarding pages 23-25 of applicant's arguments, applicant argues that Betts does not disclose Betts does not disclose the Reed-Solomon encoder or a data interleaver, the multiplexer or the exclusive OR unit. Jun already discloses the Reed-Solomon encoder, a data interleaver, the multiplexer and the exclusive OR unit. Jun does not specifically disclose a first data packet switch before said Reed Solomon encoder capable of determining whether a data packet is a full rate data packet or a half rate data packet, said first data packet switch capable of sending a full rate data to said Reed Solomon decoder and capable of sending a half rate data packet to said data interleaver; and a second data packet switch after said trellis encoder capable of determining whether a data packet is a full rate data packet or a half rate data packet, said second data packet switch capable of sending a full rate data packet to a multiplexer and capable of sending a half rate data packet to an exclusive OR unit. However, Betts teaches the use of two data switches, as disclosed in fig.1, elements 16 and 42. Also note Betts' switch 42 is located after the trellis encoder, and switch 16 can be located after the data randomizer 10, and col.2, In.37-43 discloses the utilization of exclusive OR operations for permitting the transmission of data to an exclusive OR unit. Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to combine the teachings of Jun and Betts, as a whole, for implementing the data switches so as to guide the full rate or low rate data packets to their proper destination for receiving and viewing television programs and other programming in an efficient, precise manner. Both Jun and Betts are combinable and useable together because both references pertain to the same analogous data communication and data distribution environments. The examiner recognizes that obviousness can only be established by combining or modifying the teachings of the prior art to produce the claimed invention where there is some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to do so found either in the references themselves or in the knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art. See In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 5 USPQ2d 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1988)and In re Jones, 958 F.2d 347, 21 USPQ2d 1941 (Fed. Cir. 1992). In this case, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to combine the teachings of Jun and Betts, as a whole, for implementing the data switches so as to guide the full rate or low rate data packets to their proper destination for receiving and viewing television programs and other programming in an efficient, precise manner. Also, it must be recognized that any judgment on obviousness is in a sense necessarily a reconstruction based upon hindsight reasoning. But so long as it takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made, and does not include knowledge gleaned only from the applicant's disclosure, such a reconstruction is proper. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 170 USPQ 209 (CCPA 1971). Dependent claim 10 is rejected for at least similar reasons as claim 9. Thus, the rejection of the claims is maintained.